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ABSTRACT
With increasing frequency, and from a growing number of quarters, it
is being argued that cooperative relationships between government and
private enterprise will shape the destiny of America's cities. This thesis
is concerned with one manifestation of this new emphasis: joint public/
private development projects. These are instances in which local govern-
ments and private developers pool their resources for the purpose of
planning, financing, building, and marketing development projects. The
analysis is structured around case studies of two such projects--Charleston
Center in Charleston, South Carolina, and Copley Place in Boston.
The aim of the thesis is to explore the following hypothesis:
Government is becoming a coequal partner with private developers in a
growing number of urban development projects, yet there exist today many
formidable obstacles to successfully completing such projects. Traditional
planning processes are not well suited to these new realities, so many
proposed joint development projects will never be built. Thus, to
enhance the prospects for these projects, planning processes that are
more attuned to the current environment for development will have to be
designed and used.
The thesis comprises five chapters. In the first chapter, joint
public/private development is defined and the argument is made that in
recent years a collection of forces has increased the amount of interest
in this kind of development. It is also argued that joint development is
consistent with an enduring tradition of privatism in American cities. The
next chapter sketches the context for the Charleston Center case.
Charleston's history, its politics and government, its demographic and
economic characteristics, and its historic preservation legacy are
discussed. The case itself is presented in the third chapter. The story
begins with a description of the planning studies that led to the
Charleston Center proposal, and ends inconclusively in a legal stalemate.
In the fourth chapter,Uthe Charleston Center case is analyzed. Seven
specific reasons why the case turned out as it did are set forth and
explained. The final chapter makes the point that, as the Charleston
Center case illustrates, many obstacles confront those who attempt to build
complex, large-scale development projects today. A case study of Copley
Place, a more successful joint development project, is presented, and
lessons are drawn from it.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary A. Hack
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
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With increasing frequency, and from a growing number of quarters,
the theme is being echoed: cooperative relationships between government
and private enterpirse will shape the destiny of our cities. From a
mayor: "There's no question that the only way the cities will be saved
is by a marriage of the public and private sectors."I From an academician:
"It becomes increasingly clear that the salvation of American, and even
world, environments will require more effective integration of efforts by
public and private enterprise, whose boundaries thereby become less
clearly marked." 2  From a businessman: "The public/private partnership
is the essential ingredient for urban vitality." 3 And from the
Comptroller of the Currency:
The fact is, after 20 years of massive federal investment
in our cities. . .we have failed. . .This is a bleak picture.
But that is not to suggest we throw up our hands in despair
or bury our heads in the sand and blindly persist in our
old ways, hoping for the best. On the contrary, we should
open our eyes, face up to the new environment, and adapt to
it. . .We should walk into the desert in front of us and make
it bloom. . .How do we accomplish this? We must use our
limited public sector dollars to attract investment from the
much more massive resources of the private sector." 4
This thesis is concerned with one manifestation of this new
emphasis: joint public/private development projects. As defined
here, these are instances in which local governments and private
developers pool their resources and expertise for the purpose of
planning, financing, building, and marketing development projects. In
essence, then, these are business deals in which tradeoffs are made,
and risks, benefits, and profits are shared. A growing list of projects
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meet this definition; two of the best known are the Hartford Civic Center
and the Inner Harbor I project in Baltimore.
There are significant differences between joint development projects5
and projects associated with urban renewal and other programs in which
incentives are offered to private investors. In urban renewal, local
governments (with the aid of federal funds) planned projects, assembled
and cleared land, provided infrastructure, and sold the land at a write-
down to private developers. From this point on, the projects were largely
in the hands of developers, who also reaped any resultant profits. In
addition to urban renewal, a variety of other devices, including tax
abatements, loan guarantees, and grants of land, have been used to
entice private developers to serve public objectives. One important
distinction between these efforts and joint development is that in these
programs the public sector is not involved throughout the development
process, as it is in joint development. A second distinction is that in
these programs the public sector does not ally itself with a specific
developer at the beginning of the development process, as it does in
joint development. Finally, in joint development the public sector
expects a greater return for its investment than it does in other
publicly-aided development programs. While this conception of the public
role is more an evolutionary outgrowth of previous cooperative efforts
involving government and private developers than a sharp break with such
efforts, the past and present can be clearly differentiated.
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Origins of Joint Public/Private Development
In many respects, the interest in joint public/private development
is consistent with an enduring tradition of privatism in American cities--
a belief that private interests serve, or can be led to serve, the
public welfare. From the earliest days of the nation, competing success-
fully for new development has often been considered essential to the
survival of towns and cities. For example, in Main Street on the Middle
Border, Lewis Atherton tells of turn-of-the-century competition among
Missouri towns for a new shoe plant. Local boosters felt that "future
returns would justify any current sacrifice. Such a plant would boom the
price of property; vacant houses would be filled; and all would find
employment at good wages."6 The winning town offered a cash bonus of
$60,000, and also agreed to furnish free a factory site, water and sewage
disposal.7
The most widely known example of cooperation between the public and
private sectors in urban development is urban renewal. This program was
established by the Housing Act of 1949 in response to three perceived
problems: the shortage of housing; the presence of slums; and the
slumping economy.8 These problems were to be combatted through slum
clearance and stimulation of the housing market. The overwhelming
emphasis of the Act was on private enterprise, and its implementation was
to be largely a local government responsibility.
During the 1950's and the early 1960's, the Housing Act underwent
a series of amendments. In 1954, the emphasis on slum clearance and
redevelopment was expanded to include the rehabilitation and conservation
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of deteriorating areas. In 1956, relocation payments were authorized
to help displaced families and businesses meet the costs of moving.
Finally, the percentage of the federal grant funds that could be used for
projects that were not predominantly residential was increased from 10 to
20 percent in 1959, and to 30 percent in 1961, as the program's emphasis
shifted from housing to revitalizing the economic base of cities. During
these years, billions of public dollars were spent and over 1500 projects
were initiated.
By the late 1960's and early 1970's, though, the program was being
assailed from a number of directions. Neighborhood groups became
increasingly vociferous in their opposition to urban renewal and highway
construction. They were joined by environmentalists, who objected to
what they felt were the intolerable costs of such programs. This coalition
eventually became so powerful that in many areas of the country it became
impossible to proceed with large-scale development projects. Owing to
these and other forces, urban renewal fell into disfavor, and in 1974 it
was consolidated with six other programs into the Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program.
In recent years, at least five forces have acted to alter the
relationship between the public and private sectors in urban development.
These are: (1) the "discovery" of new kinds of development opportunities;
(2) the emergency of new federal incentives; (3) the worsening fiscal
condition of governments; (4) the improved investment climate in cities;
and (5) the shift toward more active involvement of local and state
governments in economic development activities. Each of these is briefly
discussed below.
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New Development Opportunities. Development sites that were
previously overlooked are being used more often. For instance, the air
space over highways and transit stations, which in the past was seen as
just that--air space--is now viewed as a development opportunity in
space-starved cities. The Copley Place project in Boston, in which hotels,
retail stores, offices, and housing are to be constructed over the
Massachusetts Turnpike, is an example of this trend. A consequence of
these projects is that public and private bodies have of necessity
gained experience in working with each other.
New Federal Incentives. Federal programs have been altered to
permit--or even encourage--more cooperation between the public and private
sectors. For instance, the range of permissable expenditures under the
CDBG program was expanded in 1977 to allow the use of funds for the
acquisition or construction of commercial or industrial buildings or
structures. 9  In that same year, the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG)
program was established. UDAGs areintendedto be discretionary, one-time
grants for projects promising rapid results; they are to "take advantage
of unique opportunities to attract private investment."10  In fact,
the federal government likes to see at least a four-to-one "leveraging"
of private investment to public dollar input.11 Thus, to capture these
grants, cities must interact and coordinate with private developers.
Fiscal Austerity. Growing dissatisfaciton with tax burdens has led
or, in some instances, forced governments to tighten their belts. As a
result, little additional public money will be available in the forseeable
future for new go-it-alone physical and economic development programs.
The response of many observers has been to conclude that the private
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sector will have to lead the way toward accomplishing development goals.
As a federal official recently wrote.
We must structure incentives that will channel private capital
into cities in sufficient quantities and with minimal federal
expenditures. . .We have to comb through our programs,
systematically spot the places where public money is doing
something that private money could do, and then devise a means
of drawing the private money into the job. 12
Improved Investment Climate. It was not long ago that doomsayers
were delivering eulogies for cities and the "urban crisis" was a much-
discussed topic. Masses of middle- and upper-income persons had fled to
the suburbs; companies had joined them; and new development projects in
the city were rare. But in more and more cities this tide is shifting.
The migration of affluent young persons has reached such proportions
that "gentrification" is now seen as a problem. Companies, too, are
returning. In New York, for instance, more than a dozen large
corporations, including Avis, United Brands, and Coca-Cola, moved back
into the city between 1975 and 1979.13 And cities as varied as Los
Angeles, Houston and Minneapolis are in the midst of unprecedented
construction booms. This is not to say that all of the problems that once
beset central cities have been solved; but only that many cities are
undergoing a revival of sorts, and that the investment climate in many
places has improved markedly.
New Economic Development Programs. Local and state governments are
becoming more actively involved in promoting and enabling economic
development. They are experimenting with new organizational vehicles,
such as community development corporations and economic development
corporations; new financing techniques, such as tax increment financing
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and industrial development revenue bonds; and new funding sources, such
as Small Business Administration loans and UDAGs. Although many of these
tools are controversial, and others have only been tested in the short run,
the movement is clearly toward a more aggressive, entrepenurial role for
local governments.
Individually, each of these trends encourages or facilitates
cooperation between the public and private sectors. Together, they
constitute a powerful force in this direction.
Privatism and Urban Development
The tradition of privatism in American cities stresses the
legitimacy of, and dependence upon, private initiative in the resolution
of urban problems. In an earlier period of American history the private
sector was actively engaged in the provision of basic municipal services:
police and fire protection, water supply, sewage disposal, and public
transportation. Even education and welfare were largely private
responsibilities. Today, of course, the provision of these services has
become almost exclusively a function of government. Nevertheless, the
ethos of privatism continues to shape public responses to community
problems.
Commitments to privatism are articulated not only by businessmen,
but often by public officials, labor leaders, and community activists;
they are subscribed to by a large portion of the general public as well.
To cite an example, A.J. Cervantes, the former mayor of St. Louis,
argued that:
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It is primarily up to private enterprise, and not to
government, to upgrade the disadvantaged, to provide
training for the unemployed, to break down the complexities
of job components, to employ the willing, to make them
able, to push for social betterment, to dissolve the ghettos,
to break through the vicious cycle of welfarism, to integrate
the poor into an affluent economy, and to rebuild the cities. 14
And Robert W. MacGregor, President of Chicago United, a group of
business leaders in that city, recently wrote:
Urban strategists should concern themselves with the decline
of privatism, or the failure of the private sector to do
more. . .Some leading urbanologists believe that the cities
are strangled with insolvable problems today, and that the
cities of America will die. If privatism is not encouraged,
the prophets of doom could be accurate. 15
Charles Lindblom and others argue that private enterprise occupies
a unique position in American public policy because of a mutually
acknowledged interdependence between government and business. 16 Cast
in urban terms, their argument would be as follows: Business provides
a city with taxes and jobs for residents, and the city provides business
with markets and employees. Thus if one suffers, so must the other.
If a business does poorly or goes bankrupt, the city loses part of its
tax base and a number of jobs. If a city and its residents are in
economic straits, the market for goods produced by business falters, and
the labor supply deteriorates.
Others explain the bond between government and business in the
resolution of urban problems in less abstract terms. They maintain that
large amounts of resources are necessary to address such problems, and
that only the private sector holds these resources on the requisite scale.
Thus, a HUD official remarked: "The largest assets of the modern urban
system are in private hands. To be effective, government programs. . .
must leverage these funds." 17
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In either case, the results are the same: government provides
incentives to, accomodates the demands of, and tries to forge alliances
with private enterprise. In an important sense, then, public/private
development projects are simply a new twist to one of the pervasive
themes of American government.
Setting the Stage
This thesis looks at how the collaborative process works in joint
public/private development projects. Although the existing literature on
this kind of development is voluminous, in general it does not reveal
much about why some efforts are more successful than others. Descriptions
of projects and chronologies of events abound, but perceptive analyses
of processes are rare. Thus, the whole of experience with joint
development somehow appears less than the sum of its parts. Indeed, the
whole is hard to sum at all, because the parts are so varied.
The analysis is structured around a case study of Charleston Center,
a proposed joint development project in Charleston, South Carolina. The
case study approach was chosen because it allows information and
"solutions" to be presented against a realistic backdrop of political
history, conflicting demands and competing interests. When done well,
a case study captures the unique aspects of events or processes, much
as the clinical approach in psychology is able to present the unique
situation and personal background involved in analyzing and individual's
behavior.
The thesis comprises five chapters. In this chapter, joint public/
private development was defined and the argument was made that in recent
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years a collection of forces has increased the amount of interest in
this kind of development. It was also argued that joint development is
consistent with an enduring tradition of privatism in American cities.
The next chapter sketches the context for the Charleston Center case.
Charleston's history, its politics and government, its demographic and
economic characteristics, and its historic preservation legacy are
disucssed. The case itself is presented in the third chapter. The story
begins with a description of the planning studies that led to the
Charleston Center proposal, and ends inconclusively in a legal stalemate.
In the fourth chapter, the case is analyzed. Seven specific reasons why
the case turned out as it did are set forth and explained. The final
chapter makes the point that, as the Charelston Center case illustrates,
many obstacles confront those who attempt to build complex, large-scale
development projects today. An example of a successful joint development
project is presented, and lessons are drawn from it.
The aim of this thesis is to explore in a reasonably systematic way
the following hypothesis: Government is becoming a coequal partner with
private developers in a growing number of urban development porjects, yet
there exist today many formidable obstacles to successfully completing
such projects. Traditional planning processes are not well suited to
these new realities, so many proposed joint development projects will
never be built. Thus to enhance the prospects for these projects,
planning processes that are more attuned to the current environment for
development will have to be designed and used.
There was a second--and less high-minded--reason for undertaking
this study. It is perhaps best captured in a statement made by James Q.
-17-
Wilson a few years ago: "Understanding politics, a very difficult subject
to comprehend, is intrinsically satisfying; and it needs no other
justification than that." 18
-18-
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CHAPTER TWO
CHARLESTON CENTER: THE CONTEXT
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One who visits and studies Charleston, South Carolina, cannot help
but be struck by the marked contrasts of the city. There is the
Charleston everyone prizes: the historic lower peninsula that has been
called "the richest lodeof urban antiquities in America." 1 Here closely-
packed, carefully restored houses grace narrow, tree-lined streets. Many
of the residents of this area live much as their ancestors did generations
ago. For instance, it is not uncommon for them to close their Broad Street
shops and offices at two o'clock and walk home to dinner. And traditions
such as exclusive social clubs, Wednesday afternoon dancing lessons for
children and debutante parties still linger. It was to this city that
William Allen White was referring when he called Charleston "the most
civilized town in the world." 2
Yet there are other sides of Charleston that are less talked about,
but just as visible. The city has a central business district that is
in physical and economic decline. It is sprinkled with pockets of poverty,
where housing is deteriorated and unemployment rates range as high as 35
percent. 3 And the rate of violent crime is among the highest in the
country. As Mayor Joseph P. Riley has said, Charleston is, in many
respects, "a microcosm of a large eastern city." 4
Understanding the context of the Charleston Center case requires
an understanding of these realities. It is also necessary to know
something about the city's history, its politics and government, its
demographic and economic characteristics, and its historic preservation
legacy. These topics are briefly discussed below.
-22-
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Hi story
Charleston's origins can be traced back to the mid-1600's when King
Charles II rewarded several of his supporters by making them Lords
Proprietors of Carolina. In 1670, the Lords Proprietors and other
colonizers landed in Carolina and founded a settlement on the west bank of
the Ashley River. The population of Charles Town grew quickly. By
1700 it was about 2,700; by 1730 it was about 4,000; and by 1770 it was
about 15,000. At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Charles Town was
the fourth largest city in the American colonies.
The economy of the city also burgeoned. Within a few years of its
founding, Charles Town was one of the busiest seaports on the Atlantic
coast, mostly on the strength of its raw material exports. Fortunes were
amassed by the merchants and planters involved in this trade, allowing
the merchants to build large, well-appointed houses in the city and the
planters to build lavish estates, complete with gardens laid out by the
best landscape artists of the day. Many of the planters also commissioned
townhouses, often of their own design. The city's wealth, its heterogenous
population and its "style" gave it a cosmopolitan air that earned it the
nickname "Little London."
Unlike many other southern cities, Charleston was not physically
devastated by the Civil War. But the economic disruption and depression
that followed the war were so extreme that the city never fully recovered.
Paradoxically, it was these years of impoverishment that made Charleston
what it is today: a coherent, almost totally preserved city, unlike any
other in the nation. It is often said that at the war's end the city
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was "too poor to paint and too proud to whitewash." It lacked the sort
of industry that has to destroy in order to create, and its householders
lacked the money to modernize. As DuBose Heyward described Charleston
in Porgy, it was "an ancient, beautiful city that time had forgotten
before it destroyed."5
The city did not receive any real economic stimuli until after World
War II when Mendel Rivers, a South Carolina Democrat, became the head of
the House Armed Services Committee. Soon the Pentagon was funneling vast
sums of money into the area to build or expand a variety of military
bases. These developments heleped attract new industries, ranging from
chemical processors to manufacturers of diesel engines. Charleston's
economy was given another major boost when its port facilities were
modernized to accomodate container technology. Owing to these and other
developments, the city is, in some respects, enjoying a second lease on
life. Its suburbs are rapidly expanding; tourism is booming; it has new
cultural attractions; and preservation activities are stronger than ever.
Yet this prosperity has not been a panacea, for some segments of the
population are no better off than before, and growth has been accompanied
by problems of its own.
Politics and Government
Until recently, Charleston was noted for its political conservatism,
and decisions were quietly made by a handful of people. But two develop-
ments in the last five years have changed this tradition. The first was
the election of Joseph P. Riley, Jr., as mayor; the second has been the
increased participation of blacks in public decision-making. Riley, a
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native-son Democrat, was elected in 1975 after his predecessor, who had
been in office 16 years, resigned to accept a federal post. He was
re-elected in 1979 after running unopposed. As mayor, he has been an
activist and, at least in Charleston terms, a liberal. (Opponents
derisively call him "LBJ"--"Little Black Joe"--for his courtship of black
voters.) He has been described as "a very ambitious political mover with
great savvy," 6 and there is talk of his running for governor.
The changes in the city council have been just as marked. Early in
1975, because of a federal court order, the council was reduced from 16
to 12 members. The court also mandated that council members be elected
by district rather than at-large. As a consequence, six blacks were
elected to the council in the election later that year, making it the
first time since Reconstruction that half the members of Charleston's
city council were black. Predictably, this has led to demands for greater
attention to the problems of blacks, who constitute about half the
population.
These changes in the composition of city government have had far-
reaching consequences. Among the most signficant is that in the last five
years Charleston has changed from a city that refused to accept federal
money to one that is heavily dependent on grants from Washington. Almost
50 percent of the city's general revenue now comes from the national
government, and a full-time specialist is now employed to coordinate the
various programs for which money is received. Structural changes have
also occurred. For instance, the planning department staff has been
expanded and a separate office of downtown revitalization has been
established. Another manifestation of the new realities is the housing
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rehabilitation program that is underway in a low-income black neighborhood.
And if the Mayor has his way, more changes will occur, for it is his
goal to see Charleston move "back to being a part of the cutting edge of
this country."7
Demographic and Economic Characteristics
Since the first census was taken in 1790, Charleston's population
growth has been mercurial. The long-term trend, though, has been one of
slow growth. The census of 1790 lists a population of 16,359. It had
doubled by 1840, but did not double again until the early 1960's, and
only then with the aid of annexations. The county's population, in
contrast, has moved rapidly upward, especially since 1930. Up until 1940,
the city contained more than half the population in the county. Post-War
suburbanization, however, reversed this pattern: the county's population
is now about 260,000, or about four times that of the city.
The racial composition of the population is in flux. The city's
population was about 45 percent black and 55 percent white in 1970, but
it is likely that more than half the population is now black, due to the
annexation of a predominantly black area in 1977. Charleston has a
greater percentage of families below the poverty level and a greater
percentage with incomes above $25,000 than any other city in the state.
Poverty is a particularly acute problem. In 1970, the incomes of about
22 percent of the families in the city put them below the poverty line, and
for black families this figure was almost 42 percent. The unemployment
rate is about six percent overall, but varies widely throughout the
city.
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Charleston's economy is supported by three pillars: government,
shipping, and tourism. All nine of the city's largest employers are in
some way tied to government. Together they employ 11,913 persons, or
about half of the total work force. The federal government, the state,
and private corporations all operate port facilities in the city. Trade
volumes have been growing steadily and are expected to continue to grow
for at least the next ten years.
A variety of factors, including a vigorous promotional campaign and
heightened interest in preservation, have contributed to the ever-increasing
number of tourists who visit Charleston. The annual total has increased by
40 percent since 1975 and 60 percent since 1970. This increase is not
without its problems, and many residents feel that the very factors that
attract visitors in the first place--the city's "liveability" and human
scale--may be threatened. Frances Edmunds, the Director of the Historic
Charleston Foundation, is one who has expressed concern. "We've already
got big, smoky tourist buses rolling down streets hardly wide enough for
a car," she said. "You get too much of that and you begin to lose what
Charleston is all about. Is it worth all the money you make?"8
Historic Preservation
In the early 1900's old buildings were being razed to make way for
new ones in Charleston, and it had become stylish for the rich to remove
flagstones from the city's walkways to more northerly latitudes. Gates,
balconies, and old tiles were taken to grace homes on Long Island; and at
one point an entire three-story house was carried off. Charlestonians had
long been noted for their fighting spirit, though, and early in 1920,
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when it was announced that one of the most distinguished houses in the
city was to be demolished for a filling station, a group of them formed
the Society for the Preservation of Old Dwellings in order to defend it.
The House was bought and saved, and the filling station was built in the
rear garden. The event began the preservation movement in Charleston.
Throughout the 1920's the Society for the Preservation of Old
Dwellings sounded a clarion call whenever old buildings were threatened,
and succeeded in rescuing some of them from destruction. It became
increasingly apparent, however, that they would not be able to acoomplish
their goals unless they had tools other than persuasion at their disposal.
The Society began to cast about for possibilities, and found that the
mayor was also a supporter of their cause. Together they arrived at a
unique, but promising approach: a zoning ordinance that included provisions
for protecting historic structures. The ordinance, which was adopted in
1931, designated a 23-acre section of the city as "Old and Historic," "for
the preservation and protection of historic places and areas of historic
interest." 9 Within this area, proposed changes to exterior features of
any building had to be approved by a five-member board of architectural
review.
By the late 1930's many of the preservationists in Charleston were
concerned that, despite their efforts, not enough progress had been made
toward accomplishing their goals. Some buildings had been restored, but
they constituted a small percentage of all those of architectural or
historic value. And two shortcomings of the 1931 ordinance had surfaced:
it afforded protection to only a fraction of the valuable buildings in
the city; and it only delayed, rather than prohibited, the demolition of
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buildings in the Old and Historic District. As a step toward rectifying
these problems, the Carolina Art Association, many of whose members were
interested in preservation, conducted a survey of the city's architecture.
The results were published in a book entitled This is Charleston. It
listed and illustrated over 1,100 buildings of architectural or historic
merit, and each was classified as "nationally important," "valuable to the
city," "valuable," "notable," or "worthy of mention."
This is Charleston provided "moral support" for preservation10 and
was called "one of the finest pieces of public information in the field," 11
but preservationists still felt that further action was needed. Although
they were not sure at first what the next step should be, an answer was
provided in 1946 when the director of Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., visited
Charleston and suggested that the Carolina Art Association sponsor a
foundation for the purchase of old buildings. This suggestion was well
received and the Historic Charleston Foundation was established in 1947.
From the outset, the Foundation's goal was to encourage the
preservation of districts rather than individual buildings. Little headway
was made in the first few years, but in 1957, with the aid of a large
donation from a philanthropist and smaller matching donations, a revolving
fund for the purchase and restoration of signficant buildings was
established. After considering a number of possible areas for a
demonstration of the use of the fund, the Foundation chose a seven-block
tract that it dubbed Ansonborough.
The Ansonborough project received almost universal acclaim as an
exemplary example of historic preservation and inner-city revitalization.
In all, over 50 buildings were acquired. In some cases, facades were
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restored by the Foundation; in others, it restored both facades and
interiors. In most instances, though, the properties were not restored at
all, but instead resold with convenants requiring exterior restoration and
preservation. An even greater number of buildings were purchased directly
by individuals encouraged and emboldened by the Foundation's lead.
Buoyed by this success, the Foundation began a drive to strengthen
the preservation-related features of the city's zoning ordinance. In
1964, it hired a lawyer to examine ordinances in other cities to see
what reforms would best suit Charleston. By "happy coincidence," 12
the city council initiated studies for a new zoning ordinance a year
later. A special committee of the Foundation and its attorney met often
with the city planning and zoning commission during its deliberations.
The new ordinance, which was adopted in 1966, differed substantially from
the 1931 version, especially in its treatment of the Old and Historic
District. Most significant was a tripling in size of the district--from
about 150 acres to about 450 acres--so that it included Ansonborough as
well as most of the other previously excluded concentrations of significant
buildings. In addition, the sections of the ordinance related to the
board of architectural review's powers to postpone or prohibit the
demolition of historic structures were strengthened.
In the last decade, there have been two significant preservation
activities undertaken with governmental assistance: an inventory of the
historic architecture of the city, and a historic preservation plan. The
Inventory of Historic Architecture, which builds upon the information in
This is Charleston, is intended to serve as the "definitive" catalog
of the architecture in Charleston's lower peninsula. 13 The purpose of the
-31-
historic preservation plan is to provide "the sum of proposed actions and
programs designed to perpetuate Charleston's historic and architectural
heritage as an irreplaceable part of its living fabric." 14
Since its release, the city has taken action on two of the recommend-
ations of the Historic Preservation Plan. First, the area of the Old and
Historic District was increased to about 800 acres in 1975; it now includes
the entire lower peninsula except two tracts of state-owned land. And
second, a height ordinance, which specifies minimum as well as maximum
heights in the various districts, was adopted late in 1978. Both of these
actions were strongly supported by the various preservation organizations
in the city.
The story of historic preservation in Charleston, then, is a success
story, marked by innovation and driven by private individuals and civic
organizations. Government has been involved, but in a reactive,
contributory way rather than as a leader. When asked to cite the most
important reason for the success of preservation in the city, those
involved invariably answer that people have made the difference. According
to Charles B. Hosmer, the "grandfather" of preservation historians,
"Charleston, per capita, has had more far-sighted people who have been
trying to create the basic philosophy of preservation than any other
place in America."15 And Henry Cauthen, director of the Preservation
Society of Charleston, (formerly the Society for the Preservation of Old
Dwellings), says that while other factors are important, "committed
people" have been the key component of the preservation effort in
Charleston.16
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CHAPTER THREE
CHARLESTON CENTER: CASE STUDY
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Background and Planning
The inconclusive saga of Charleston Center began in 1975 when the
Downtown Council, a branch of the Chamber of Commerce, formed a steering
committee to stimulate revitalization efforts in the lower King Street
area, Charleston's central business district. Previous historic preser-
vation and neighborhood revitalization efforts had conspicuously bypassed
this area of the city. Indeed, it suffered from the standard catalog of
problems affecting troubled downtowns: high rates of crime and unemploy-
ment, empty stores, declining sales, and physical deterioration. The
city's rate of violent crime, much of it downtown, was among the highest
in the nation. Flanking the downtown were low-income, high unemployment
areas.1 About 30 storefronts on King Street were vacant, and four major
department stores had pulled out and relocated in suburban malls. 2 Gross
retail revenues had declined since 1970.3 And between 1970 and 1975, the
assessed value of property on lower King Street fell by about 50 percent.4
The steering committee was comprised of King Street merchants and
property owners, city officials, realtors, and representatives of
neighborhood and preservation groups.5 One of the committee's first tasks
was to approach the mayor and the city council for money to conduct a
preliminary revitalization study. The city agreed to provide $10,000 and
Barton-Aschman Associates, a consulting firm with previous experience in
the city, was hired to undertake the study.
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Barton-Aschman began by conducting workshops to help define the
problems of and prospects for the downtown. These were attended by over
200 persons, including businessmen and residents from the King Street
area, members of associations with an interest in King Street, city
officials, and representatives of the media. 6 Seven goals for the downtown
emerged from this process:
o Preserve the quality of life in the peninsula area while
encouraging orderly economic growth.
o Reduce crime and the fear of crime in the King Street corridor.
o Increase the daytime and nighttime population of the lower
peninsula by all feasible means.
o Improve the existing commercial establishments and attract new
commercial activity into the King Street corridor.
o Identify and initiate key redevelopment and rehabilitation
activites in the King Street corridor.
o Provide new employment opportunities which would raise the income
levels of existing downtown residents.
o Provide attractive pedestrian and design linkages between the
vario s activity areas while maintaining the identity of each
area.
In December of 1975, Barton-Aschman released its report, entitled
"A Commercial Revitalization Program." It summarized the results of the
goal-setting process, outlined a work program for the subsequent phases of
the revitalization effort, and described implementation techniques and
potential sources of funds for revitalization. Among the implementation
techniques described were organizational alternatives, such as non-profit
development corporations and downtown advisory commissions; and "tools,"
such as special assessment districts and public improvement areas. The
list of potential sources of funds included general obligation bonds,
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Economic Development Administration (EDA) grants and loans, and
community development block grant (CDBG) funds.8
The Downtown Council, encouraged by this preliminary report, used
it to support a request to the city for $100,000 of its CDBG allocation to
help pay for a more detailed revitalization plan. Recently-elected Mayor
Joseph P. Riley, whose campaign platform had included pledges to inject new
life into the King Street commercial district, was receptive to their
request. With his support, the city council agreed to provide $100,000 for
the plan; later this was augmented by a $50,000 grant from the Liveable
Cities Program of the National Endowment of the Arts.
Barton-Aschman Associates was again selected to prepare the plan. It
took the consultants a year to complete their work, during which time
public input was periodically sought.9 The "Charleston Commercial
Revitalization Plan" was released in March of 1977. It was actually five
plans, one for each of the "planning districts" into which the downtown
had been divided. These plans described development opportunities and
recommended improvements for the five districts. In addition, each of
the plans included an implementation program which outlined the costs,
public and private responsibilities, funding sources and timing for the
suggested improvements.
One of the "key" development oportunities identified in the Commercial
Revitalization Plan was a vacant parcel of land, known as the "Belk
property," where a department store had formerly stood. The plan for this
district envisioned a joint public/private development consisting of a
350-room hotel, a 450-space parking garage, a 30,000 square foot convention
center, and a 30,000 square foot department store on the Belk site. 10 The
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anticipated benefits of such a development were that it would serve as an
anchor for the lower King Street retail area, provide "pedestrian linkage"
between this area and the redeveloped market district, and help attract
conventions to the city. 1
Formulation of the Charleston Center Proposal
At this point the city, under the leadership of Mayor Riley, assumed
primary responsibility for promoting the development. 12 The Mayor
established an Office of Downtown Revitalization as an adjunct to his
office, and hired Kenneth Gifford, who had supervised preparation of the
Charleston Commercial Revitalization Plan for Barton-Aschman, as executive
director. The Office of Downtown Revitalization quickly prepared and
mailed brouchures urging developers interested in undertaking the proposed
project to contact the city. These brochures described the development
opportunity as follows: "Schematic plans indicate that the site could
accomodate a 400-room hotel, a large parking structure and 20 to 30
thousand square feet of convention-conference space. In addition, ground
floor area could also accomodate approximately 30,000 square feet of
prime retail space." 13
Seven developers responded to the city's solicitation. No formal
criteria for selecting a developer had been established, but instead city
officials waited to see what kind of replies they received. 14 Eventually,
Theodore Gould, president of the Washington, D.C.-based Holywell
Corporation, was chosen. (At the time, Gould was under attack from
Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus in Washington D.C. and was also involved
in a controversial project in Miami.) Reasons for selecting him included
DOWNTOWN
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his willingness to work closely with city officials, his demonstrated
ability to finance and manage projects like the one proposed, and the
fact that he had taken out an option on the Belk property. 15
Gould's architects--Grigg, Wood and Brown of Charlottesville,
Virginia, and Vlastimil Koubeck of Washington, D.C.--moved rapidly to
produce a design for the project. Gould had received a commitment from
Mayor Riley and Kenneth Gifford for a project larger than that described
in the brochure,16 and the designers proceeded under this assumption.
While the designs and plans were being formulated, meetings were
occassionally held with small groups of city officials and businessmen.
Opposition Develops
Late in 1977, Gould unveiled his plans for "Charleston Center" at a
city council meeting. They called for the development of a 431-room hotel;
a 532-space parking garage; 93,000 square feet of new commercial space; and
a 65,000 square foot (gross area) convention center. The project was to
occupy most of the block bounded by King, Meeting, Hasell and Market
streets. The hotel was to rise from the interior of the block, and two-
and three-story buildings were to line the perimeter. The facades of most
of the existing buildings were to be preserved, and new buildings were to
be erected behind them.
The total cost of the project was estimated at $38 million. The city
was to use a $4.15 million urban development action grant (UDAG) and issue
general revenue bonds to acquire property, demolish portions of 29
buildings and relocate their tenants, and make street improvements. It was
also to issue revenue bonds to pay for the convention center and the
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parking garage. Holywell was to lease these from the city for 40 years--
thus retiring the bonds--and build the hotel and the commercial space at
a cost of $23 million.
Although the details of the plan were still sketchy at this point,
the city council approved of the project "in concept."17 Others,
however, were furious when they learned of the intentions of Gould and the
city. Owners of existing businesses on the block opposed both plans to
condemn their properties and the way these plans were presented to them as
a fait accompli. Preservation and neighborhood groups opposed the proposal
for a host of other reasons, and moved quickly to condemn the project. The
Historic Charleston Foundation and the Preservation Society of Charleston
issued critical statements as did a neighborhood organization, the
Harleston Village Association. Two other neighborhood organizations, the
Charlestown Neighborhood Association and the Historic Ansonborough
Neighborhood Association, adopted resolutions opposing the proposal.
In general, opponents resented the rapid transformation of the
relatively small project suggested in the Charleston Commercial
Revitalization Plan into a "significantly larger" hotel/convention center
complex.18 They believed that the mayor had decided to steamroll a
larger project through after the "carrots" of federal funding and millions
of dollars from a national developer were dangled in front of him.19
Ann Satterthwaite, a consultant hired by critics of the project, described
the situation as follows: "Mayor Riley is. . .very ambitious. He's young
and has caught Jimmy Carter's eye. As soon as he saw the potential for the
center, I think he decided to tie his fortune to its rising star." 20
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Other, more specific, criticisms were voiced as well. These are
perhaps best summarized in a statement released by the Historic Charleston
Foundation:
We are convinced that the complex is out of scale with
the block on which it is located, and with the surrounding
blocks, and that it will have an adverse effect on the
historic and architectural quality of the Historic District.
We are convinced that the block under consideration is too
compacted--that the various buildings required by the
developer; the square footage worked into their formula; the
number of rooms required in the hotel; the needs of the
parking garage for entrances, turnings, bus holding, pick
up and delivery; the requirement for the retail spaces; all
added to the additional requirement of a convention center
(or conference center) with a very large assembly hall and
the requirement of necessary open spaces, patios, etc. that
would give the complex some appeal that all this development
in the one block will indeed create a massive intrusion in
the area, and have an adverse impact on the quality of life
in the Historic District.
In addition, there is a very real objection on our part
to the demolition of the major portion of the buildings on
the west side of Meeting Street between Market and Hasell
Streets leaving only the facades. These will then become
false fronts to buildings contrived behind them. Buildings
that really have no integrity of their own, as the first
two floors--of very little depth will be represented as shops--
new shops--with old fronts--and above all that a parking deck.
To all this we object.
We maintain the position taken in. . .favor of new
retail space and a smaller new hotel on the vacant portion
of the block. We would welcome relief, however, from the
diverse usage of this block, and are reluctant to encourage
a new facet of the tourist industry, conventions, in an area
in which tourist congestion has become a problem.21
1978: Supreme Court Decision and Draft EIS
With the stage thus set, the controversy entered 1978, a year marked
by two events of significance: the South Carolina Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the proposal, and an environmental impact
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statement was released. Litigation testing constitutionality of the
proposal was initiated early in the year by the city at the request of
its bond attorneys. They were concerned that unless the legality of the
proposed undertaking was established by the courts, the city would have
difficulty selling bonds to finance its portion of the project. 2 2  (South
Carolina courts are notoriously conservative with regard to condemnation
of property and other aspects of urban redevelopment; even urban renewal
was never permitted in the state.) At the invitation of the trial court,
several other parties joined the suit. 23 The plaintiffs challenged the
proposed contract between the city and Holywell on a number of grounds,
the most important being that the property to be taken by condemnation
would not be put to public use and that public money would be used to
finance a project that did not serve a public purpose. 24
In April, a lower court upheld the proposed contract and dismissed
the complaints. It held that the block under consideration was suitable
for redevelopment, thus justifying the condemnation of property. The court
also held that the city's portion of the project would serve a public
purpose, since leasing the convention facility and parking garage to
Holywell would not preclude the public from using them. 25
The plaintiffs appealed the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
where it was heard in August. The Supreme Court overturned the decision
of the lower court on the last day of the month. In a unanimous decision,
it ruled that the proposed condemnation of private property to provide a
site for the project failed to meet state requirements that condemned
property be used to serve a public purpose. The court's opinion stated
that "the proposed plan would allow the city to join hands with a private
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developer and undertake a project primarily of benefit to the developer,
with no assurance of more than negligible advantage to the general
public. "26
Before the trial, Mayor Riley's position was that an adverse ruling
would constitute a death knell for the project. 27 He changed his mind
afterward, though, and said that while the Supreme Court ruling was an
"important setback," the project was "not killed." 28 Moreover, he said
that he and other city officials began considering alternative plans for
the project "within five minutes of hearing the court's decision."29 A
week later, Riley, Gifford and other city officials flew to Washington to
meet with representatives of Holywell to try to salvage the project.
At about this same time, an 800-page draft environmental impact
statement (EIS) was released by the city. It described the proposed
project and four alternatives (including the "no build option") and
compared them with respect to their impact on the physical environment,
land use patterns, transportation and traffic, employment, taxes and
"aesthetics." At the end of the analysis, the proposed project emerged
as the best of the alternatives. The draft EIS concluded that it would
"provide a major new anchor for the historic commerical district. . .and
.further stimulate private investment in the area. The total impact
of the proposed action therefore is a major contribution to the conser-
vation of the historic commercial district, which in turn has a major
positive effect on the preservation of the surrounding historic residential
neighborhoods. "30
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After the release of the Draft EIS, Mayor Riley commented:
We're very pleased with results. It appears to confirm
and endorse the hotel/convention center as being far superior
to the conditions that now exist downtown. It clearly points
out that the alternative proposed by the city overall meets
the goals and objectives of the central business district.31
1979: The President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Design
Changes, and More EIS's
The next eventof importance occurred on January 20, 1979, when the
President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation held a public hearing
on the proposal. The hearing was required by the Historic Preservation Act
on 1966, which requires the President's Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation to review and comment on federally-funded undertakings that
affect properties listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The
Historic Charleston Foundation announced its intention to hire three
nationally-known architects--Malcolm Holtzman of New York, Jean Paul
Carlhian of Boston, and Hugh Jacobson of Washington, D.C.--to review the
plans for the project and suggest design changes. Mayor Riley announced
that Holywell had hired another architect, Pietro Belluschi, to review the
hotel design in consultation with the principal architects.32
Opponents of the project expressed numerous complaints at the
hearing. Representatives of the Preservation Society of Charleston charged
that the hearing was "premature" since neither final design plans nor an
EIS were available to the public beforehand. 33 The president of the
National Center for Preservation Law, whose organization had been invited
to enter the fray by opponents, made similar complaints and asked for
a continuance of the hearing until all the facts were available to the
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public. He closed with a warning: If you choose to proceed without /
hearing on the EIS7, we will seriously consider whatever action may be
necessary to prevent the consumation of your work." 34 A representative
of the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Russell Wright, co-
author of the city's historic preservation plan, also made critical
statements.
Two days after the Advisory Council hearing, a "Revised Draft EIS" was
released. Physically, the plans were almost identical to those presented
in the Draft EIS. Financial arrangements, however, were significantly
different. The city was to use a $3 million EDA grant and bond revenues to
build and operate the parking garage; make street and utility improvements;
conduct archeological, historical and environmental reviews; and administer
the project. Holywell was to acquire the necessary sites and build the
hotel, retail and commerical space, and the conference center. To help
finance these activities, the city, through the Charleston Local Develop-
ment Corporation, was to lend Holywell $4.15 million in UDAG funds. 35
On February 24, 1979, a public hearing on the Revised Draft EIS was
held. By this time the dispute over the center was vitriolic, and
cirticisms of the proposal were sharper than ever at the hearing. After
attacking the "inadequacy" of the EIS, a group of opponents, including
members of the Preservation Society of Charleston and the Charlestown
Neighborhood Association, as well as consultant Ann Satterthwaite, walked
out of what they referred to as "an illegal public meeting." 36 A
spokesman for the National Trust for Historic Preservation also criticized
the EIS.
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Others spoke in favor of the project and the EIS. Mayor Riley
commended the EIS and called it "exhaustive." The sentiments of another
supporter, who urged that the city "quit fooling around and build the
complex," were shared by many in the audience. 37
On the following day, the architects hired by the Historic Charleston
Foundation released their assessment of the proposal. They described the
general approach of the plan--lining the perimeter of the site with low-
rise buildings and positioning the high-rise "slab" at the center in an
effort to diminish the visual impact on pedestrians--"correct" and
"commendable," but added that" the preliminary design does not completely
succeed based on [these] project concepts." 38 They recommended that the
height of the hotel be reduced by two or three stories, and criticized the
"style" of the buildings and some of the details of the project.
In mid-May, an "agreement in principle" was reached between city
officials and staff members of the President's Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation. The agreement acknowledged that the project would
have both adverse and beneficial impacts, and included a list of stip-
ulations intended to "avoid or mitigate" the negative impacts. Among
these were measures to reduce the impact of increased tourism and guidelines
for restoring the facades and buildings that were to be preserved. Public
hearings on the memorandum of agreement were held during June and the
first part of July. It was signed by David K. Wilson, Vice Chairman of
the Advisory Council, in mid-July. Afterwards, Wilson said the decision
was "the most difficult one for me to make during my tenure on the
Council."39
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The final EIS for the project was released in September. This time,
the financial arrangements remained the same and modifications to the
physical aspects of the project were proposed. The conference center
was smaller and the height of the hotel was changed from a uniform 114
feet to 120 feet high at the center and 104 feet high at the east and west
wings. It is not clear what the impetus for these modifications was: some
observers attribute them to the advisory panel hired by the Historic
Charleston Foundation; others attribute them to Pietro Belluschi, the
architect hired by Holywell; and still others say they were made simply to
appease critics of the project.
Recent Developments and the Status of Charleston Center
In January of 1980, the city initiated a lawsuit against the Department
of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Commerce. The
stated objective of the suit is to "seek a declaration that the release of
grant funds to the City of Charleston, South Carolina from the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the United States
Department of Commerce as a prerequisite to the construction of the
Charleston Center project is not a violation of the National Enviornmental
Policy Act. . .or the National Historic Preservation Act." 4 0 After the
suit was filed, Mayor Riley said that such a declaratory judgement would
"take some of the steam" out of subsequent lawsuits filed by opponents,
thus facilitating progress of the project. 4 1
In February of 1980, the National Center for Preservation Law, the
Preservation Society of Charleston, the Charleston Neighborhood
Association, and the Harleston Village Association initiated a lawsuit
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against HUD, the Department of Commerce, the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation and the City of Charleston. The stated objective of the suit
is to:
[SJeek a declaratory judgment that with respect to the
proposed Charleston Center Project defendants have not
complied with the applicable requirements of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1966. . .the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. . .The National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966. . .[and] the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. . .4
Those who filed the suit maintain that it will be a "landmark" case because
it challenges the right of HUD to delegate environmental review responsi-
bilities to grant recipients under the UDAG program. 43
The Charleston Center battle is now more than two and a half years old
and none of the participants will venture a guess as to when it will end.
Whether Charleston Center will ever be built is just as unclear. The
estimated cost of the project is escalating due to inflation, and Gould has
threatened that if it is delayed much longer, he will allow a "family-style"
motel (rumored to be a Holiday Inn) on the vacant portion of the site.44
At a recent meeting with local businessmen, Mayor Riley promised that each
day he would ask himself, "What can I do to get the Charleston Center
built?" and said that he had just begun to fight.45 Opponents are also
digging in their heels for what might well turn out to be a protracted
conclusion to this uncivil war.
Conclusion
The Charleston Center case is at once more subtle and more signficant
than a cursory look would suggest. No one involved wears a black hat;
indeed, both sides can credibly claim to have the good of the "tout
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ensemble" as their overriding objective. Nor is it an open-and-shut
issue such as a fast-food restaurant threatening to destroy an historic
cemetery. Opponents and proponents agree that the Belk property should be
developed, and plans have been modified several times in response to
criticisms. What really lies at the heart of the controversy is
disagreement over the direction in which the city should move. Those who
favor the proposal tend to be of the opinion that Charleston can no longer
remain isolated from the realities of the twentieth century. As Kenneth
Gifford says:
This is the first thoughtful architecture Charleston has had
in years. Just think, if some of these preservationists had
been around 200 years ago trying to save Charleston's original
buildings, half of the buildings they now want to save would
never have been built in the fir4 place. This city just
can't exist anymore in a vacuum.
Those who object to the proposal argue that the city is different, that it
is fragile, and that Charleston Center would be too much too fast. One
critic commented:
Charleston is like a redwood forest. These old buildings,
this town, have as much environmental significance as the
most pristine wilderness area. We shouldn't mess with
them. 47
And another explained: "You see, Charleston is a whole way of life and
the Center is diametrically opposed to it. We'll do anything to stop
it. "48
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHARLESTON CENTER: ANALYSIS
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The question to be addressed in this chapter can be simply stated,
although its answer cannot. The question is: Why has the Charleston
Center controversy reached an impasse? Or, from a slightly different
angle: Why, despite their best efforts, have neither the proponents nor
the opponents of the project been able to emerge victorious? In many
respects, it would be accurate to answer that it is simply the nature of
the proposal. That is, many of the explanatory variables do not relate
only to Charleston Center; they also affect other similar undertakings.
Some of these are analyzed in the following chapter. Other explanatory
variables are, however, specific to Charleston Center, and they provide
the focus for the discussion in this chapter.
As a way of structuring the discussion, the perspective of the
proponents will be assumed. In other words, the events and decisions that
have prevented construction of the project will be emphasized. It will be
argued that some of the problems encountered were beyond the proponents'
control, while others were clearly of their own making. In the first
category are the existence of well-organized and powerful preservation and
neighborhood groups, and two other factors that, for want of better
titles, will be called "the two-edged sword of federal involvement," and
"an irony of the UDAG program." In the second category are the city's
lack of experience with similar projects, shortcomings of the planning
process and the plan, political miscalculations by city officials, and
the nature and distribution of the project's costs and benefits.
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The City's Lack of Experience with Similar Projects
Underlying many of the problems encountered was the fact that the
city government had no experience with projects like the Charleston Center:
it was larger and more expensive than any project ever undertaken by the
city, and it was the city's first involvement with joint public/private
development in any of its guises. This lack of experience had several
consequences. One was that the city had neither the necessary staff
expertise nor the administrative machinery to undertake such a project.
Another was that city officials were overly sanguine about the ease with
which the projectcouldbe undertaken. And finally, it was more difficult
for proponents to convince others of the benefits of the project, since
they could notcite similar existing projects as examples.
Cities that become involved in public/private redevelopment programs
often emerge from the experience with significantly altered governmental
structures. For instance, in the cities where urban renewal programs were
most pronounced, such as New Haven, Atlanta, and Philadelphia, central-
ization of political power was increased and redevelopment bureaucracies
were formed.1 Because renewal provided a new source of patronage and
capital expenditures that translated into potent political resources, and
because it involved large-scale projects requiring coordination and control,
structural support was provided for entreprenurial, centralizing mayors
like Richard C. Lee of New Haven. 2 Urban renewal also provided cities
with the staff expertise and patronage jobs required to build bureaucratic
machines in redevelopment agencies. In many instances these agencies
became important forces in city administration.3
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Charleston does not have a history of participation in such programs,
so it never underwent these changes. That the power of the mayor was
not strengthened is of no great consequence, since the mayor has
traditionally had at his disposal the formal authority and resources to
enable him to be the most powerful force in city politics. But the lack of
a redevelopment agency with its staff expertise is important. A redevelop-
ment agency could have managed the city's role in the project, and staff
expertise would have helped the city avoid some of the pitfalls it
encountered. An example is the original contract between the city and
Gould: it was struck down by the state Supreme Court, but if it had been
structured differently it would have withstood the Court's scrutiny.
Although Mayor Riley and other city officials were by no means
unsophisticated, they were not aware at the outset of the project that
what seemed to be a relatively straightforward proposition would quickly
become almost inextricably complex.4 There have been legal problems,
economic problems, and pervasive political problems. Nor were city
officials aware of how much of their time the project would consume.
Since Riley's election in 1976, the project has always been near the top
of his agenda, and officials of the Office of Downtown Revitalization have
done little else since the office was established in 1977. Recently,
Riley cited the drain that the latest lawsuit filed by opponents would
have on his administration. He said that he and other city officials
would have to spend at least a month this year in Washington, and
estimated that the cost of legal services would be between $100,000 and
$150,000. As a result, he added, "other aspects of city business will
suffer."5
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Another important consequence of the city's lack of experience with
similar projects is that proponents have found it difficult to convince
others of the benefits of the center, since they have no local precedents
to point to. The main argument in favor of the project is that it would
spur the revitalization of the lower King Street commercial district, but
this strikes many observers as overly-optimistic speculation. Doubts
also surround the claim that the center would encourage pedestrians to
walk between the restored market and lower King Street. Of the claimed
benefits of the center one of the few that goes unchallenged is that jobs
would be provided, but there is uncertainty even here: Estimates of the
number and types of jobs to be created have been changed repeatedly, and
there is no guarantee that these jobs would go to city residents.
Shortcomings of the Planning Process and the Plan
For many decades, students of local government have been perplexed by
the fundamental "tension" that exists between the nature of urban political
culture and political systems and the requirements of systematic, "rational"
planning.6 Different approaches to overcoming or moderating this
discrepancy have been put forth. From these has emerged a politicized
concept of planning which stresses that planning must be linked to a
better understanding of the social structure and political processes of a
community. Emphasis is placed on the idea that, to attain desired changes,
adequate support must be mobilized within the community. During the
planning process, therefore, attention must be devoted to devising
strategies for consensus-building, coalition-formation, persuasuion, and
bargaining. 7
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An effective plan is one that anticipates the constraints on the
user's freedom of action and attempts to meet his criteria of how the
plan can be employed in the situations that are expected to arise. It
must be amenable to the various contingencies that can be anticipated. A
plan that depends heavily upon an ability to predict and control future
social-political developments, or one that is too inflexible to permit
adaptation on the basis of learning, feedback, new information, or
unexpected political developments, is often a plan that goes unimplemented.
The planning process and the plan for Charleston Center violated
these tenets. For the most part, planning for the project was done in
secrecy and little effort was made to include a variety of interests and
groups in the process. This led to suspicion about the project (opponents
like to relate stories of "back room, back-of-the-envelope deals" between
city officials and Gould), and meant that the constituency in support of
the project was not as strong as it might have been. In addition, it led
city officials to underestimate opposition to various aspects of the plan.
In part because of the process through which it was formulated, the
plan provided opponents with many easily assailable targets. Two of its
components--the proposal that the city build and then lease the convention
center and the garage to Gould, and the proposed condemnation of existing
properties on the site--encountered harsh criticism and were eventually
declared illegal by the state Supreme Court. This damaged the perceived
legitimacy of the project and forced city officials and Gould to restructure
their financial arrangement. The plan also called for the partial or total
demolition of most of the existing buildings on the site. This, too,
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damaged the project's prospects. Such structures are revered and
zealously protected in Charleston, and opponents were quick to attack the
demolition plans.
Political Miscalculations by City Officials
If attention to political realities is important during the process of
formulating a plan, it is imperative that they be considered once the
implementation process is initiated. Success depends upon the ability to
foresee those interests and groups likely to oppose different aspects of
the plan in varying degrees and with various instrumentalities. Opponents
have to be "won over," "neutralized," or effectively "bypassed." In
instances where nothing can be done to assuage the recalcitrant head of
an organization, an interest group, or even an aministrative office, the
plan must be re-examined or altered to reduce its vulnerability to this
particular impediment.
Often it is the quality of leadership that makes the difference
between achieving outstanding success, mediocre or uneven results, or
miserable failure of planning efforts. With regard to urban renewal in
New Haven, for example, "very little happened until redevelopment
became attached to the political fortunes of an ambitious politician,"
Mayor Lee, who possessed political skills of a high order.8 In Cleveland,
on the other hand, ineffectual mayoral leadership contributed to the
failure of a program of urban renewal that was overly ambitious,
inadequately planned, and poorly implemented. At one point the situation
was so bad that the Department of Housing and Urban Development temporarily
cut off support to the city. 9
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The quality of leadership and the political miscalculations of
proponents are among the most important reasons not a brick has been laid
in the Charleston Center case. Perhaps the most obvious example is the
proponents' underestimation of the power and perseverence of preservation
and neighborhood organizations in the city. These groups had long played
an important, and often decisive, role in Charleston's political scene,
yet few efforts were made to anticipate or respond to their criticisms.
Indeed, they have been confronted head on. This does not sit well in a
city whose politics were recently described as follows: "Charleston has
been a city of accomodation--a place, in the words of one local attorney,
where everyone knows pretty much what he can get and doesn't push hard
beyond it." 10 Rather than play by these accepted rules, however, city
officials and other supporters of the project have been bellicose and
intransigent. To cite an example, Mayor Riley recently made a speech in
which he called opponents of the project "selfish, narrow-minded people
[who] aren't going to ruin the city of Charleston," and referred to some
of the complaints in the opponents' latest lawsuit as "outright lies." 11
This approach has angered foes of the center and contributed to the
intensity of their opposition. And, at least at this point, it has
precluded the possibility of an amicable resolution of the conflict.
The Existence of Well-Organized and Powerful Preservation and Neighborhood
Groups
Preservation and neighborhood groups in Charleston have little formal
power, but they do have other political resources including money,
expertise in dealing with government, and public support. Moreover, they
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have a track record of successfully opposing development proposals. For
instance, in 1973 the city granted permission to a developer to raze a
block of buildings in the lower peninsula for the construction of an eight-
story condominium complex. Preservationists feared that the development
would "unalterably change the character of Charleston by reshaping the
skyline, allowing more high-rises, and cutting off Ansonborough" from
the rest of the city. 12 They were able to block the proposal by purchasing
the site with the proceeds from a nationwide fund-raising campaign which
was aided by editorials in The Washington Post and television commercials
shown throughout the country.
As is mentioned above, proponents of the project adopted a strategy of
fighting these groups rather than working with them. At first, opponents
attacked specific aspects of the proposal--its design, height, traffic
impacts and so forth. Butas modifications made some of these changes
groundless and as the city responded with counterarguments, opponents
climbed on to the higher plane of symbolic issues. Specific, bounded
conflicts gave way to battles between "the neighborhoods" and "city hall"
and between "local residents" and an "out-of-town developer."
Had they not reached for broader symbolic issues, the fact that the
opponents' specific objections to the center were sometimes without merit
might have seriously hurt their position in both mobilizing support and
dealing with public bodies such as the President's Advisory Commisison on
Historic Preservation. Turned into a symbolic issue and a crusade to
save "Historic Charleston," however, opponents did not have to argue the
case point by point. They merely had to appeal for the support of their
-66-
neighborhoods and way of life--a position far more difficult to challenge
then objections to buildings of a certain size and design.
The Nature and Distribution of Costs and Benefits
Charleston Center would affect the interests of different groups of
people within the city in quite different ways. Many of the best
organized, most articulate, and most influential groups are convinced that
they would bear an inordinate share of the costs of the project. Through
the use of a variety of strategies and tactics they have acted, in effect,
as "veto groups" (to use David Reisman's term) and successfully thwarted
the proposal.
But this analysis begs the question: Why do not the putative
beneficiaries of the project organize and apply pressure counter to that
of the veto groups? The answer is that some persons have found it in their
interest to do so while others have not. In addition to city officials,
supporters include the two daily newspapers and downtown businessmen and
property owners. With the exception of city officials, the editors of
the newspapers are probably the only persons in the city who consider it
their duty to consider issues from the perspective of the "public interest"
as a whole. Their position is that it is usually best served by phsyical
and economic growth and change. Not unexpectedly, therefore, they back
the project. 13
Downtown businessmen and property owners favor the project for
another reason: it promises to help them make more money. Businessmen
hope that it will increase the volume of their trade by attracting
tourists and suburbanites into the area, while property owners see
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increased turnover and higher property values and rents as consequences
of the project.
Although important, the support of these actors has not been enough
to tip the scales in favor of Charleston Center. Broad public support
might have been able to do so, but for two reasons it was not forthcoming.
First, some of the benefits of the project are in the nature of "public
goods"--that is, they are such that if anyone benefits, all must benefit.
Cleaning up the vacant Belk site and reducing crime in the area are
examples. Second, even though many of the benefits will accrue to specific
individuals--persons who obtain jobs, for instance,--it is difficult to
predict exactly who they will be. In both cases it would be irrational for
the ordinary citizen to lobby for the project, since he would probably not
receive benefits comnensurate with his costs of taking action. 14
The Two-Edged Sword of Federal Involvement
Federal involvement in the Charleston Center case is problematic, for
it is at once essential and harmful. Federal dollars, in the form of
grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Economic Development Administration, are central to the financing of the
project. Yet these funds did not come unencumbered. The city had to
comply with various federal regulations, which proved to be a time-consuming
and expensive process that left it vulnerable to attack on a number of
fronts.
Gould would not have become involved in the project without the
enticement of public funds, and the city would not have been able to offer
such assistance without federal largesse.15 The HUD and EDA grants were,
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in an important sense, "free goods"--paid for by persons outside
Charleston and thus not requiring a reallocation of funds away from
competing city departments. Had such a transfer of funds been required,
the Mayor would have been forced to bargain with his own agencies rather
than allowing him to present the grants as gifts to the city. This
would have been yet another obstacle in the path of the project.
Along with federal funds, though, come federal regulations and
requirements. Two of these proved to be particularly onerous. One was
the preparation of an environmental impact statement for the project, four
versions of which have been released thus far. Preparing these cost the
city thousands of dollars and thousands of hours of staff time. Another
was review of the project by the President's Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation. This, too, required significant expenditures of city
resources.
Political tolls also accompanied these requirements. Complying with
them decreased the probability that the center would be built, because
it brought more participants into the arena and added to the long and
tortuous path of decision points that had to be cleared. 16 For instance,
not only did the EIS's provide grist for opponents and their consultants,
but they also provided excuses for outside groups, such as the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, to become involved. To cite a second
example, the President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation signed
a memorandum of agreement on the project only after prolonged negotiations,
and even then it contained a list of stipulations.
As important as these consequences of using federal funds were, they
have been overshadowed by another consequence: the use of federal funds
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for the project has meant that opponents can challenge it on the ground
that applicable federal laws, such as the National Historic Preservation
Act of 1966 (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
were not complied with. NHPA is the less well-known of these two laws; it
requires that the effects of proposed federal undertakings on structures
or districts included in the National Register be considered by the heads
of federal agencies having jurisdiction over such undertakings, and that
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation be given an opportunity to
comment on such undertakings. 17 The requirements under NEPA are similar,
but broader in scope. It requires the preparation of a detailed statement
of the environmental impacts of major federal actions that significantly
affect the human environment. These statements must include analyses of
the adverse environmental effects of the proposed actions and alternatives
to the proposed actions.18
In a move that could deal a final blow to the Charleston Center
proposal, opponents recently filed a suit charging that the city did not
fully comply with the requirements of either law. Among other charges,
opponents contend that the Advisory Council failed "to give full and
adequate consideration to" the project, and that "the execution of a
Memorandum of Agreement by the Executive Director of the Advisory Council,
who is not a member of the Advisory Council, does not comply with [NHPAJ." 19
The suit also maintains that the EIS for the project was inadequate because
insufficient attention was given to alternatives to the proposed project
and because the potential negative environmental impacts of the project
were not sufficiently analyzed. 20
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An Irony of the UDAG Program
A primary goal of the UDAG program is to quickly obtain results from
funded projects. The irony is that in the Charleston Center case two of
the mechanisms for achieving this end had the opposite effect: they
impeded, rather than facilitated, the progress of the project. The first
of these was the requirement that the city obtain a commitment from a
developer before applying for a grant. This provided an incentive for the
city to forge an agreement with a developer in as little time as possible,
and to engage in a planning process that emphasized producing a proposal
for the project rather than building a constituency for the project.
The delegation of environmental review responsibilities to grant recipients
is a second mechanism for facilitating the progress of funded projects.
Not only was conducting the necessary reviews a time-consuming, expensive,
and politically perilous process in the Charleston Center case, but it
eventually landed the city back in court. The ultimate effect of these
"short cuts," then, was to prolong the amount of time before the project
got underway.
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The Changing Environment for Urban Development
Joint development projects, like almost all activities in which
government is involved, confer benefits on some people and impose costs on
others. Twenty years ago, the negative impacts of development programs
were usually accepted as the inevitable price of progress. Today, however,
plans for new development often meet with impassioned opposition. A classic
example of this shift in attitudes regarding development is the anti-
highway revolt. During the early 1960's highways were built in inner city
areas with little resistance. In time, though, a backlash developed in
older, high-density cities like Boston and San Francisco; later it spread
to such newer, auto-oriented cities as Denver, Miami, and Portland
(Oregon).1 Resistance to urban renewal followed a similar pattern. For
over a decade the program proceeded in an atmosphere of relative quiescence,
but during the 1960's opposition to renewal plans grew increasingly
strident. A more recent illustration is the UDAG program. According to
Kathryn Welch, who is conducting a study of the program for the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, 176 UDAG programs in almost as many cities
have been embroiled in controversy.2
Not only do proposals for new construction often arouse opposition,
but in a growing number of cases opponents are emerging victorious
from development conflicts. Anti-highway groups have successfully
blocked expressways and drastically curtailed construction plans
in cities throughout the country. Criticism of the urban renewal
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program caused its emphasis to shift from clearance and redevelopment to
rehabilitation. In more and more instances, UDAG-supported development
projects are being thwarted. And so on. More examples could be cited,
but the trend is clear: in many places the balance of power in the arena
of urban development has tilted in favor of the opponents of development.
Altshuler and Curry cite three trends that underlie this shift:
the development of consensual federalism; the extension of citizen
participation; and judicial activism and preferred values. 3 They use the
term "consensual federalism" to refer to the fact that almost all publicly-
supported development projects in urban areas today require the active
cooperation of two or more levels of government. Federally-aided highway
and urban transit investment decisions are an example. Proposals must be
initiated by state and/or regional agencies, often in cooperation with
affected local governments. They must then be submitted for advisory review
to regional planning agencies and, in most instances, to a variety of state
and federal agencies. Federal agencies also oversee decisions to allocate
funds and award contracts, and must approve substantive products, ranging
from planning reports and environmental analyses to actual construction.
The procedural requirements associated with this process are so complex
that parties left out of the emerging consensus on a project can almost
always find a plausible ground for legal challenge. Thus power is widely
dispersed, and any project that arouses signficant controversy is doomed to
defeat. 4
Two popular movements that have had significant impact on urban
development policy for the last decade or so are the anti-highway movement
and the environmental movement. In recent years, they have been joined
-76-
by the neighborhood preservation movement and the historic preservation
movement. Insofar as urban development is concerned, these groups have
been more effective in opposing change than promoting it, even though
many of the persons involved want to channel their energies in constructive
directions. Imminent "bads" seem to be a more powerful galvanizing force
than potential "goods," so negative reactions are more common than positive
actions. As a result, the growth of citizen participation in development
decisions has been an important conservative influence. 5 For in most
instances the status quo is zealously guarded, and construction that is
likely to have a disruptive impact is opposed.
Since the late 1960's,1aws have been enacted to protect the environment,
improve the quality of governmental planning, guarantee opportunities for
citizen participation, and protect those who may be adversely affected by
development projects. The intent of this legislation is to underscore the
values of previously underrepresented or minority interests that development
agencies were thought to be neglecting. It has had the effect of elevating
these values to a favored place in the framework of judicial priorities,
thus strengthening the hand of those who would oppose development projects.6
With respect ot urban development these changes have, like increased
citizen participation, acted as barriers to change.
By adding to the stock of power held by opponents, the three trends
discussed above make it more difficult to undertake urban development
projects. A fourth trend acts in the same direction--against successful
development--but by reducing the power of a group of persons who are among
the strongest supporters of new development: mayors. They are increasingly
faced with the problem of governing cities in which the traditional sources
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of political power have for the most part been dispersed or eliminated.
Old-style political machines are a thing of the past, and party organization
is generally weak. Thus, mayors can no longer "buy off" their opponents
with jobs, favors and patronage; nor can they rely on loyal party
lieutenants who occupy lesser city offices and sit on the council. Instead,
the power to govern must be pieced together from whatever sources are
available. So even though mayors usually favor new development, they often
have trouble building effective constituencies in support of projects.
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that these trends have
had the same effects in every city. In some places large, disruptive
projects are still being constructed with minimal opposition. Renaissance
Center in Detroit is a notable example. But in an ever-larger and more
varied set of places, projects are meeting with stiff opposition.
Nor is the discussion meant to imply that these trends are undesirable.
On the contrary, they have caused a great deal of poorly planned develop-
ment to be stalled in its tracks, and have allowed progress to be made
toward protecting important societal values, including environmental quality,
neighborhood security, and participatory democracy. The discussion is,
however, intended to demonstrate that the preponderance of power in the
urban development arena is no longer held by those who favor new development.
In fact, in some cities, the balance has shifted the other way. This
brings to light a danger inherent in these trends: the possibility that
new projects will be indiscriminately stopped, thus forcing cities to
forego desirable as well as undesirable development.
The challenge, then, is to design a course of action that allows
the benefits of new development to be realized, while at the same time
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minimizing its most onerous costs. Given the trends described here, it is
clear that this process will somehow have to accomodate and reconcile the
differences between competing interests. The traditional approach to
planning publicly-supported projects, in which essential decisions are made
by a few key participants and then submitted to the general public for
comments, has proved inadequate to the task. Resorting to litigation--now
a common method of resolving development disputes--is costly, time-consuming,
fraught with uncertainty, and divisive. Moreover, it has meant that judges,
whose duty it is to interpret laws, are increasingly going beyond their
bailiwick and making critical trade-off decisions in development conflicts.
Thus, a growing number of observers argue that planning processes that
involve affected individuals and groups from the beginning, and that
explicitly allow for bargaining and negotiation, offer the most promising
way out of the development impasse.7 To date, speculation about this kind
of approach has overshadowed actual experience with it, but there is a small
number of cases in which development conflicts were successfully handled
through negotiation. One of these, the Copley Place project in Boston, is
discussed below.
Copley Place
On April 30, 1980, the Boston City Council voted unanimously to
approve an application for a UDAG to help build Copley Place, a development
project recently characterized as "the largest, most expensive and most
socially complex. . .ever proposed in Boston." 8 Copley Place will be a
mixed-use development including two hotels, a major department store, other
retail space, offices, and some luxury housing; it is to be builtover
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the Copley Square interchange of the Massachusetts Turnpike. Upon hearing
of the council's decision, the developers said that construction would
begin within six months9-almost four years after they had first mentioned
development of the site to state officials.
The council's vote ended several weeks of intense negotiations that
had begun as the deadline for submitting the application to HUD was
approaching. The city administration and the developer were at odds over a
resident-jobs policy, and neighborhood groups concerned about displacement
had pressed for a commitment to build housing adjacent to the site of the
project. Agreements on these issues were reached just days before the
deadline. Such negotiations had been an integral part of the planning
process since its inception. In an attempt to avoid the development
paralysis that had plagued other projects in the city, 10 various levels of
government, the developers, and citizens' groups had worked together
throughout the process. This appears to have been a successful approach,
and it offers lessons for other cities.
1976-77: The Plan Takes Shape. The planning process that eventually
led to the Copley Place proposal began late in 1976 when developer K. Dun
Gifford approached John Driscoll, Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, with plans for a large mixed-use development on air rights
owned by the Authority near Copley Square in downtown Boston. Gifford had
earlier formed a development company, Great Bay Co., Inc., with Ben
Thompson, a Cambridge-base architect known for his design for the
renovation of the Quincy Market complex. Thompson and Gifford had then
entered into an agreement with the Chicago-based Urban Investment and
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Development Corporation (UIDC), and had secured a commitment from Western
International Hotels to build an 800-room luxury hotel as part of the
development.
It was not until early in 1977, though, that actual planning for
the project got underway. At that time, Gifford and Thompson met with
Frank Keefe, Director of the Massachusetts Office of State Planning, to
discuss their proposal. Keefe then discussed the proposal with Governor
Michael Dukakis and Transportation Secretary Fred Salvucci. All three state
officials were impressed by the proposal, both because of the firm
commitment from Western International Hotels and because of the track record
of UIDC, which had recently completed Water Tower Place, a nationally-
recognized, multiple-use development in Chicago. 11
Keefe and Salvucci disagreed, however, on what the best way to
respond to the development opportunity would be. Keefe argued in favor of
granting the prospective developers an option on the property and for
immediately initiating impact assessment and citizen reveiw functions,
thus facilitating the progress of the project. Salvucci contended that
granting the option on the property would reduce public control over the
scope and nature of the project. He felt that the more common approach of
developing guidelines and later selecting the developer was fairer, and
politically more prudent. 12
In April, Governor Dukakis made a decision that was to shape the
future of the project when he chose the course that Keefe advocated. Soon
thereafter, the Turnpike Authority entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with UIDC that gave them a six-month option on the site, and the Governor
asked the Office of State Planning to coordinate a six-month analysis of
-81-
the environmental constraints and "community desires" associated with the
project. To accomplish the latter task, a "citizens advisory group" was
to be established, and periodic meetings were to be held with state officials,
UIDC, and project consultants. In a memorandum to other state officials,
Keefe explained that "this decision-making process is reflective of the
desires of state and city government to work directly and cooperatively with
an interested developer. . .while ensuring full and active participation by
public agencies and community groups to promote an appropriate and acceptable
project." 13
Shortly after the Memorandum of Agreement was signed, MIT Professor
Tunney Lee was hired to organize and staff the citizens advisory committee.
A list of potential participants was drawn up by Keefe and Dan Ahern,
Director of the Back Bay Federation for Community Development. State
Representatives Barney Frank and Mel King subsequently reviewed the list
and added a few names. Eventually, letters of invitation were sent to
groups as diverse as the St. Botolph Street Citizens Committee, a
neighborhood association in a middle-class area; the Tent City Coalition, a
group concerned with the needs of low-income South End residents; and the
Back Bay Federation, a coalition of area businesses and institutions.
The Citizens' Review Committee (CRC), as the citizens' group became
known, convened for the first time in the middle of May. Its initial
charge was to formulate a set of recommendations for development of the site.
The Committee was given a clear sense of the scale of the project and the
mixture of uses it would contain, but little more. Thus it was, in effect,
anticipating the impacts of a project that was still in the incipient
stages of planning. The state put various technical resources, such as
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advice on transportation and legal issues, at the CRC's disposal, and Lee
himself handled the physical planning issues.
At first, CRC meetings were devoted to providing committee members
with information about the development process and the impacts of develop-
ment. After this was accomplished, the committee began to develop guide-
lines to present to the Office of State Planning and the developer. The
process was one of continuous feedback: Lee would compile draft guidelines
on the basis of what he heard at one meeting, and these would be presented
for review at the following meeting.
The CRC presented its final recommendations to the Office of State
Planning in September, and then disbanded. The recommendations were
organized around statements of general goals, which were translated into
guidelines and finally into specific steps expected of the developer,
the state, and various community organizations. The goals, guidelines
and specific implementation responsibilities varied considerably in their
detail. Recommendations concerning community economic impact, pedestrian
access and linkages, traffic, and project massing were quite specific;
those concerning retail impacts, stabilization of the South End, and
environmental impacts were rather general.
Because it had been actively involved in the CRC's deliberations, the
Office of State Planning was not surprised by the Committee's recommendations.
In the middle of October, Keefe forwarded them to UIDC along with a letter
of support. A month and a half later, representatives from UIDC, the
Turnpike Authority, and the Office of State Planning met to discuss the
recommendations. With some reluctance, UIDC agreed to many of the
committee's suggestions, including the provision of 100 units of housing,
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modifications to the project's access ramps, and development of a portion
of the site that had not been included in earlier plans. 14
On December 15, the Turnpike Authority and UIDC amended the
Memorandum of Understanding, thereby extending the developer's option on the
property for a year. In addition, the agreements regarding the CRC's
recomendations were incorporated into the Memorandum.
1978: Consummation of Negotiations with the State. In early 1978,
the cast of characters changed significantly when Great Bay Co. withdrew
from the project. Gifford had earlier run afoul of Boston Mayor Kevin
White, and in discussions with UIDC, White had indicated that Gifford's
association with Copley Place would not help the project secure the
necessary approvals from the city. 15 Since UIDC officials were also
dissatisfied with Gifford's performance as the local agent for the develop-
ment team, they decided not to continue the cooperative venture. 16 The
Architects Collaborative, a Cambridge-based firm, was hired to replace
Ben Thompson.
Secretary of Environmental Affairs Evelyn Murphy issued a
Determination of Scope and Alternatives for the project's Environmental
Impact Report in May. It outlined the air quality, traffic and pedestrian
circulation, visual quality, utilities and services, wind, noise, and
hydrology issues that were to be addressed in the EIR. The consulting firm
of Environmental Research and Technology was hired by UIDC to prepare the
report.
The Office of State Planning reconvened the CRC late in June. The
Committee began its second summer of work by reviewing the new development
plans prepared by The Architects Collaborative. These plans conformed
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substantially to their recommendations, so the CRC decided to concentrate
on other issues. During July and August, Lee organized a series of work-
shops to investigate impacts from the project that had been given less
attention than others in the first round of discussions. These included the
effects on Back Bay business, the population composition of surrounding
neighborhoods, and air quality.
By the end of October, Environmental Research and Technology had
completed a draft Environmental Impact Report for the project, and CRC
participants turned their attention to the study. Several members of the
Committee expressed concern about the project's air pollution effects,
especially the problem of "hot spots" at parking facility exits.17 Others
felt that the impacts of traffic congestion and parking had been inadequately
analyzed. 18 The concern of Committee members was shared by Secretary
Murphy, who approved the Environmental Impact Report but called for further
examination of these and other issues. 19
In the Democratic primary in September, incumbent Governor Dukakis was
upset by Edward J. King. As a result, the state actors in the Copley case
felt increased pressure to get the lease for the project signed. Negotiations
at this time revolved around two major issues. The first was affirmative
action provisions. After marathon bargaining sessions on this point, the
state finally agreed to lower from 25 to 20 percent the number of
construction jobs that would be required to go to minority workers. The
second major issues was the rent schedule for the project; eventually
agreement on this point was also reached.
The lease-signing ceremony occurred on December 22. Before the cere-
money, Governor Dukakis issues a press release in which he hailed the
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planning process for the project as "a national model for successful
citizen participation in the planning and design of large-scale urban
projects." 20 Mayor White also released a statement praising the project.
Other endorsements came from a variety of neighborhood and community
groups.
But not everyone was happy with the agreement. The Neighborhood
Association of Back Bay, for instance, issued a statement that criticized
the project as too large and charged that the traffic and air pollution
impacts had been underestimated. 21 And the Coalition for Responsible
Development, a group of residents from the areas surrounding Copley
Square, complained about cutbacks in minority hiring quotas, the elimination
of a quota for hiring area residents, and the lack of mechanisms to
prevent housing costs in the South End from rising. 2 2 Nevertheless,
Kenneth Himmel, project director and vice-president for UIDC, maintained
that construction would begin in September. 23
1979-80: The Project Stalls and is Revived. At a public meeting
three months later, UIDC announced that it had been unable to secure
commitments from major department stores for the Copley Place project. In
their place, Himmel said that UIDC was considering a second major hotel and
other changes, but added that "currently there isn't a plan." 24 Officials
of the Boston Redevelopment Authority reported that a $10-15 million UDAG
might be sought to defray public costs such as road and utility improve-
ments. 25
In May, UIDC publicly unveiled a revised plan for Copley Place. It
called for two hotels, a one-third increase in the amount of office space,
and, possibly, a department store. UIDC representatives had earlier tried
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out a new scheme on individuals and groups in the Back Bay, in an attempt
to secure support for the plan before presenting it to the CRC. 26 This
tactic was abandoned when the developer's representative realized how
widespread support for the Committee was. 27
During the summer, the CRC focused its attention on the issues of
affirmative action, housing development on the Tent City site, and
revisions in the Environmental Impact Report required by changes in the
development scheme. The city of Boston, which became the principal public
participant in the process after the state signed the lease for the
property, began negotiations on the so-called 121A tax agreement that is
extended to most large developments in the city. At the same time, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority began to investigate the possibility of
applying for a UDAG to assist the project. Since both the tax agreements
and the UDAG program require that projects benefit low-income persons, the
CRC viewed these as opportunities to secure more construction jobs for
minority and low-income residents from surrounding communities. 28
A draft application for an $18 million UDAG was circulated for public
review in November. It stated that the grant would be lent to UIDC, and
that loan payments would be used for programs to benefit residents of the
surrounding area. Most of the comments at the public hearings on the
application concerned the impact the project would have on housing costs--
an impact many felt would be reduced if more housing units were included in
the project. For instance, at a meeting on November 19, representatives
of the Tent City Corporation suggested that 270 housing units be built, of
which 75 percent would be for low- and moderate-income families.29
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The winter of 1979-80 was marked by few events of significance. The
developers refined their plans and prepared a draft EIS for the revised
project; the city continued to work on the 121A tax agreement and the
UDAG application; and the CRC formed a committee to review the design of
the project.
The pace quickened in April, however, when the Boston City Council
held hearings on the UDAG application, which the Boston Redevelopment
Authority wanted to submit by the end of the month. Two issues became
the focus of debate: the number of project-related jobs that would go to
city residents; and the development of housing on the Tent City site. As
stated by Mayor White, the city's position on employment was that
"developers in Boston must hire Boston residents for 50 percent of the jobs
associated with their projects." 30 On April 28, UIDC agreed in writing to
require its contractors to make "good faith" efforts to reach this goal
during construction, and also agreed to encourage its tenants to comply.
The next day, after the Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority
pledged his support of a housing project on the Tent City site, the Tent
City Corporation dropped its opposition to the project. On the last day
of the month, the city council voted unanimously to approve the UDAG
application.
Implications for Charleston Center
The participants in the Copley Place planning process decided to pursue
an innovative, "up front" approach to planning for the project as much out
of negative reaction to past experience as positive reaction to the
opportunity before them. 3 1 The Copley proposal followed years of wrangling
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over another development project in downtown Boston--Park Plaza--for which
a traditional planning process had been followed. In that instance, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority formulated development guidelines, published
a "developer's kit" and sponsored a developers' competition. After the
developer was selected in 1971, he proceeded to prepared plans and an
EIS without soliciting public comment. When these were unveiled, they met
with harsh criticism. Attention was focused on the negative impacts of the
project, causing such lengthy delays in securing the necessary approvals
that 50,000 construction workers and their supporters staged a protest
march at the State House.32 Construction of the project has yet to begin,
and the original developer has long since withdrawn. This experience
provided a strong incentive for state officials to try a different tack,
one that would sustain developer commitment to the project, reduce the
amount of time before construction began, and yield a more acceptable
design. 33 The developers also realized that to build a large, complex
project in Boston, a planning process different than the one used for
Park Plaza would have to be followed, so they agreed to the state's
proposal.34
In many respects, the Copley Place planning process has been a success.
It achieved agreements between the developers and the state and between the
developers and the city in relatively short periods of time. And it
successfully accomodated the often conflicting goals of a broad range of
interests--community groups, environmentalists, a variety of state and
local agencies, businessmen, and large public and private institutions.
Major changes in the design of the project resulted from the process:
housing was added; the location and configuration of the buildings were
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modified; adverse impacts from traffic were reduced; pedestrian access
between the site, the Prudential Center, the Back Bay, and the South End
was improved; and affirmative action and resident employment quotas were
included in agreements.
Copley Place is similar in many respects to Charleston Center. The
developments were proposed at about the same time, and each would be among
the largest projects ever built in its respective city. Boston and
Charleston are old, densely-packed cities with essentially stable
populations and improving investment climates. UDAGs would be used to
facilitate the development of both projects, and in both instances city
officials are strong project supporters. The nature and distribution of
the costs and benefits associated with the projects would be similar.
Finally, in Boston as well as in Charleston local groups have successfully
opposed development projects.
Yet there are significant distinctions between the two cases that
account for their divergent outcomes. One difference is that although
neighborhood, historic preservation, and other local groups are important
in Boston, they do not figure as prominently in the city's political life
as they do in Charleston. Another difference is that the city of Boston,
unlike the city of Charleston, has participated in numerous development
projects--ranging from urban renewal projects to UDAG projects--that
required it to cooperate with private developers. Thus, Boston city
officials are aware of the complexities and pitfalls of such undertakings,
and the staff expertise of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and other
city agencies allows the city to be a contributing partner in such
projects. But the most important difference is the contrast between the
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planning processes for the two projects. In Charleston a traditional
approach was taken: the project was planned by a handful of persons
working beyond the range of public scrutiny, and no provisions were made
for bargaining among the affected parties. In Boston the public was
involved from the inception of project planning, and bargaining was an
integral part of the process.
It would be premature to draw firm conclusions about the Copley Place
planning process at this time, since a final assessment cannot properly be
made until the project has been built. The experience thus far, however,
has been encouraging. The following are among the lessons suggested by
this process:
o The "rules of the game" should be clearly established at the
beginning of the planning process, so that potential participants
are aware of how they fit into the process, of their responsibilities,
and of what is at stake.
o Citizen review and impact assessment functions should be initiated
early in the planning process, before positions harden and before
disputes arise.
o The opportunity to participate in a citizen review body should be
available to all interested persons, and the activities of the
citizen review body should be widely publicized, thus adding to its
legitimacy and credibility.
o The planning process should include mechanisms for incorporating the
suggestions of the citizen review body into the plans for the pro-
ject, and for binding participants in the planning process to the
agreements they make.
o Participants should not become locked into long-term, irrevocable
agreements at the beginning of the planning process: they should
enter into agreements that allow them to test and then confirm or
modify their working relationships and approach.
o Someone should be hired to organize and staff the citizen review
body; he should be trusted, flexible, and knowledgeable about
the issues at hand.
o The citizen review body should be provided with adequate technical
support.
-91-
o Compensation should be viewed as an acceptable solution to other-
wise irreconcilable differences of opinion.
It does not seem unreasonable, then, to argue that if a similar
approach had been followed in planning for Charleston Center, the status
of the project would be very different. For the explanation of why the
case has turned out the way it has lies less with the substance of the
proposal than with the process by which it was developed and presented. In
a city where political accomodation and close cooperation between citizens'
groups and government are common and expected, city officials and other
supporters of the project chose an adversarial approach which left little
room for constructive dialog. Part of the blame can be attributed to the
UDAG program, which encourages cities to hurriedly put together proposals
and enter into agreements with developers. But as the Copley Place example
makes clear, UDAG involvement does not preclude the use of a flexible and
sensitive planning process.
If the proponents of Charleston Center had been amenable to bargaining
and conciliation, construction might well have begun by now, although on
a project much different than the one now proposed. And there are reasons
to believe that such a process would have been successful. First, all the
participants agreed that something should be built on the vacant Belk
property. They disagreed, of course, as to what kind of development it
should be, but with some effort an acceptable compromise could have
probably been reached. Second, the major groups involved in the controversy
are well organized and have spokesmen. Thus, it would have been relatively
easy to identify and bring together participants for a joint planning
process. Third, there is a traditionof cooperation between citizens'
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groups and government in Charleston. Until the Charleston Center contro-
versy arose, these groups understood and trusted each other. Fourth, all
of the major participants in the case had something to trade. The
proponents had the project and its associated jobs, tax revenues, and so
forth; the opponents held political power and the threat of legal action.
Finally, there were focal points around which negotiations could have
been structured. For instance, public hearings on the UDAG application and
the EIS were available forums for resolving conflicts.
Perhaps the cruelest irony of the Charleston Center case is that if
the proposed project is blocked, the developer will problably build a
Holiday Inn or similar hotel on the site. No one in Charleston would like
to see this outcome, yet it looms over the dispute. Thus, in the end the
controversy might prove to be worse than a game in which one side wins and
the other loses: it could be a game in which almost all the participants
lose.
It is unclear why the Mayor and other proponents chose to exclude the
city's many neighborhood and historic preservation groups from the planning
process for the project, and why they later chose to fight these groups
rather than accomodate them. Some observers believe that the proponents
naively underestimated the sophistication and power of these groups, and
that they were surprised by the barrage of criticism the proposal received.
Others offer a different explanation. They maintain that Mayor Riley was
aware that the project would engender opposition, but felt that if he
confronted the opposing groups head on, they would eventually capitulate.
People tend to be more impressed by personal experiences than by vicarious
experiences; maybe this is also true of government. If so, Charleston
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Center may serve as Charleston's Park Plaza, and the next major develop-
ment proposal will be handled quite differently. For if the case
demonstrates anything, it is that if development disputes are to lead to
constructive ends, they must be properly managed.
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